Detection of wormhole attacks on IPv6 mobility-based wireless sensor network by Gu-Hsin Lai
RESEARCH Open Access
Detection of wormhole attacks on IPv6
mobility-based wireless sensor network
Gu-Hsin Lai
Abstract
New communication networks are composed of multiple heterogeneous types of networks including Internet,
mobile networks, and sensor networks. Wireless sensor networks have been applied to various businesses and
industries since the last decade. Most sensors have the ability of communication and the requirement of low
power consumption. 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks) plays an important role
in this convergence of heterogeneous technologies, which allows sensors to transmit information using IPv6
stack. Sensors perform critical tasks and become targets of attacks.
Wormhole attack is one of the most common attacks to sensor networks, threatening the network availability by
dropping data or disturbing routing paths. RPL (IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks) is a
standard routing protocol commonly used in sensor networks. This study proposes a RPL-based wormhole detection
mechanism. The rank of a node-defined RPL is adopted to measure the distance. The proposed detection method
discovers malicious wormhole nodes if unreasonable rank values are identified. The experimental results show that the
proposed detection method can identify wormholes effectively under various wireless sensor networks.
Keywords: Wormhole attack, Sensor networks, IPv6, RPL, Mobility
1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks with IoT (Internet of Things)
have been applied to many applications such as ecosystem
monitoring, disaster watch, building automation, health
monitoring, object tracking, and plant control. The sensor
data carry out important information such as vital signals
or disaster alerts; transmission failure or error data might
cause system malfunction or serious incidents. The exist-
ing Internet protocol IPv4 could only provide about 4 bil-
lion public IP addresses; the limited IP spaces constrain
the growth of wireless sensor network applications.
IPv6 is the latest version of Internet Protocol, a com-
munication protocol that provides an identification and
location system for the network devices in the new type
of communication networks. Many sensors and tiny de-
vices facilitate IPv6 to provide connectivity.
In wireless sensor networks, the network topology
could change due to a weak mobility (new nodes join
the network or hardware failure of existing devices) or
strong mobility (physical movement of nodes) [1]. However,
wormhole attack could also make topology change in
wireless sensor network. Therefore, building a security
mobility management mechanism is very important for
wireless sensor networks.
A typical architecture of wireless sensor networks is il-
lustrated in Fig. 1, where all the sensors transmit data to
the root. Wormhole attack is one of the most common
attacks in sensor networks. Figure 2 illustrates an ex-
ample of wormhole where the two malicious nodes, M1
and M2, form a wormhole tunnel T1 through which re-
directs the transmissions. Some routing paths going
through the wormhole tunnel might be shorter than the
normal multi-hop routes [2–4]. Therefore, wormhole at-
tacks may change the original routing paths, and the
wormhole nodes may eavesdrop or discards the data go-
ing through the wormhole tunnel. Furthermore, the two
wormhole end nodes consume more power energy than
others. Once their resources are exhausted, the sensor
network might not operate properly. Wormhole attacks
compromise the network availability and data privacy and
may cause serious security problem in sensor networks.
According to the wireless sensor network architecture,
each node usually is only aware of its neighbor nodes
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and possesses limited resources. Centralized and so-
phisticated detection methods might not be feasible
because sensor nodes only have limited computing
power. On the other hand, equipping with additional
hardware for all sensor nodes is costly. Hence, detec-
tion systems requiring additional hardware might not
be practical.
Based on the above constraints, this study proposes a
distributed detection method by applying the standard
routing protocol IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power
and Lossy Networks (RPL), available in all the sensor
nodes to identify wormhole attacks without additional
hardware. RPL [5, 6] is a standard routing protocol for
wireless sensor networks [7]. However, RPL is vulnerable
to wormhole attacks [8]. The proposed detection method
applies the rank information from RPL to estimate the
relative distance to the root node; the rank value will be
compared with that of the neighbors; if the discrepancy
exceeds a threshold value, it signals an anomaly where a
wormhole might exist.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. The proposed approach builds a security mobility
management mechanism in wireless sensor network.
2. The proposed approach does not need any extra
hardware or special powerful nodes which were
required by the previous work [2, 9, 10].
3. The proposed mechanism is based on an existing
protocol, the proposed mechanism. It could be
implemented on existing wireless sensor network
hardware.
4. The proposed mechanism is distributed; no
centralized analysis is needed. It means no additional
communication is needed.
5. The proposed system needs only few computing
resource, the lifetime of battery of devices would not
be affected.
2 Related work
In this paper, we propose a wormhole detection mechan-
ism based on RPL routing protocol. In this section, prior
works about detection of wormhole attack are reviewed in
Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we investigate the vulnerability
Fig. 1 An example of wireless sensor network topology
Fig. 2 An example of wormhole attack
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of RPL routing protocol, and some RPL-based wormhole
detection approaches are reviewed.
2.1 Prior work of detecting wormhole attacks
Wormhole attacks in wireless sensor networks were
introduced by Sanzgiri [11], Papadimitratos [12], and Hu
[2, 3, 8]. In a wormhole attack, a wormhole tunnel is
constructed by two malicious nodes. Malicious nodes will
“tunnel” their received routing information to another
point in the network and then replay them. Once the
wormhole tunnel is constructed, malicious nodes could
eavesdrop on traffic from their neighbor nodes, drop
packets or to perform man-in-the-middle attacks [4].
Hu et al. proposed two types of packet leashes: geo-
graphic leashes and temporal leashes to prevent wormhole
attacks [4]. Leashes are designed to protect against worm-
holes over a single hop wireless transmission. Geograph-
ical leash will ignore any messages from unreasonable
distance, and temporal leash will ignore any packets with
unreasonable lifetime [4]. However, to construct packet
leashes, all nodes must have synchronized clocks and their
own position. It is impractical in most wireless sensor net-
work environment.
A lightweight wormhole detection approach called
LITEWORP was proposed by Khalil et al. [9]. In LITE-
WORP, each node builds its two-hop neighbor list. By
monitoring all control traffic of neighbor, LITEWORP
could identify and isolate malicious node. However, moni-
toring and extracting every neighbors’ traffic result in
extra overload. Moreover, it is not always possible to find
guard node for particular link. The proposed system is not
suitable for nodes with limited battery capacity. Khalil et
al. also proposed a routing protocol called MobiWorp to
detect and isolate wormhole attack [13]. MobiWorp rely
on a secure central authority (CA) for global tracking of
node positions. MobiWorp also deployed a special node
called guard node to maintain a black list and monitor
network traffic. However, CA and guard node are imprac-
tical in some wireless sensor network applications.
Choi et al. proposed a Wormhole Attack Prevention
(WAP) algorithm which measured the round-trip time
(RTTs) between neighbors, identifying that two neigh-
bors which are not within each other’s communication
range are supposed to be suffering from wormhole at-
tack [14]. But, WAP algorithm could only be suitable for
wireless sensor network applications with a lot of nodes.
WAP algorithm could not detect false positive alarm
while affected nodes only have few neighbor nodes due
to lack of enough neighbor nodes’ information.
2.2 IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy
Networks
The RPL became a standard routing protocol for wire-
less sensor networks [6]. RPL is primarily designed for
6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low-powered Wireless Personal
Area Networks). Because IPv6 provide almost unlimited
IP space, it is suitable for wireless sensor network appli-
cations for point-to-point communication or point-to-
multicast communication among tiny nodes. 6LoWPAN
network is a wireless sensor network which supports
IPv6. 6LoWPAN uses IPv6 as Internet layer and IEEE
802.15.4 as data link and physical layer [7]. Differ from
typical stand-alone wireless sensor networks, devices of
wireless sensor network applications only have limited
resources, and these devices are accessible from any-
where. Hence, wireless sensor network applications are
exposed to threats both from the Internet and from
within the network. RPL protocol provides new ICMPv6
control messages to exchange routing graph information.
RPL protocol uses DIO (DODAG Information Objects)
messages to advertise information for building RPL
DODAG, and DAO (Destination Advertisement Object)
messages are used for supporting downward traffic to-
ward leaf nodes. Nodes send DIO messages periodically,
once nodes receive a DIO message, they might use the
information to join a new network or update their
routing table [6]. Now, the most popular wireless sensor
network standard like ZigBee IP supports RPL [15, 16].
ZigBee is a low-cost, low-power, wireless sensor network
standard which enable tiny and smart devices to work
together for wireless sensor network applications [15].
Therefore, the proposed system will be based on RPL
routing protocol. RPL is also vulnerable to wormhole at-
tack. Attackers could send fake ICMPv6 routing packets
to construct wormhole tunnel. Khan et al. proposed a
Merkle-tree-based authentication to prevent wormhole
attack [17]. An added authentication mechanism while
maintaining parents within a DODAG can be used for
avoiding promotion of routes encompassing malicious
nodes sending replay attacks around the surrounding re-
gion. However, building Merkle tree needs additional
communication and computation resources.
Sensor network applications make use of tiny devices
which have limited resources and electricity power.
Therefore, additional hardware requirement or compli-
cated detection algorithm is not suitable for detecting
wormhole attacks in such environments. In this article,
the proposed system is based on RPL without extra
hardware or complicated detection algorithm.
3 Proposed system
In this paper, an intrusion detection system to identify
wormhole attacks is proposed. To avoid routing loops,
RPL calculates the number of hops from a node to the
root. “Rank” in RPL represents the position of a node; it
increases when the node moves away from the root [5].
The geographic leashes [2] inspired us to use nodes’ lo-
cation to detect wormhole attacks. Rank is informative
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to estimate the distance to root node. Therefore, the
proposed system applies the rank value to identify suspi-
cious rank values from DIO messages.
To illustrate the idea of the proposed detection method,
Figs. 3 and 4 give an example of how rank values are chan-
ged before and after the wormhole tunnel is established.
Figure 3 shows the rank value of each node defined by
RPL. The root node has the rank of 0, and the rank values
represent the number of hops to the root plus one.
Figure 4 shows the change of the rank values after the
malicious nodes, M1 and M2, are deployed and form a
wormhole tunnel. When the two nodes are inserted in
the network, to update the routing table, the root node
sends DIO message to node N1 and M1; the rank of node
N1 and M1 is 1. The DIO message will be transmitted
accordingly to the following neighbor nodes to update
the rank values. It can be seen that the rank value pro-
vided by RPL is informative for estimating the distance
to the root.
The proposed detection method adopts the rank value
to identify wormholes. Figure 5 illustrates the framework
of proposed system. The RPL specification defines four
types of control messages for topology maintenance and
information exchange. In this paper, DIO messages are
first collected by proposed system, and then rank value
is extracted from DIO messages. Once DIO messages
are extracted, the proposed system will detect if the DIO
message is from malicious node or not.
The detection algorithm is outlined in Fig. 6. As this is
a distributed algorithm, each node in the sensor net-
works examines the features extracted from the packet
header to see if a wormhole exists in the network. To
shorten the detection process, the malicious nodes are
stored in a black list once they have been identified,
which will not be examined by the detection system re-
peatedly. The rank value from the IPv6 header of an in-
coming traffic is inspected to see if the rank increases
gradually or it is different from its neighbors signifi-
cantly. If the ICMPv6 message is considered as benign,
the receivers will update their neighbor table and routing
table accordingly.
This study assumes that when a wireless sensor net-
work exists, no malicious nodes when it is deployed in
the beginning. The correct routing table of each node
in the newly deployed network will be established be-
fore wormhole attack is issued. The proposed detec-
tion method defines the following two attributes to
discover abnormal DIO messages: Rank_Threshold and
Rank_Diff.
Rank_Threshold is defined as the difference of the
rank values between its parent and the node itself as for-
mulated in Eq. (1); the attribute value is obtained when
the routing table is constructed or updated. For the ex-
ample illustrated in Fig. 3, Rank_Threshold of node N5
is 1 because its rank is 5; that of its parent N4 is 4.
Therefore, Rank_Threshold of node N5 is |3 − 4| = 1.
Fig. 3 An example of RPL network topology
Fig. 4 An example of wormhole attack in RPL network
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Rank Threshold ¼ ParentRankð Þ− SelfRankð Þj j ð1Þ
Rank_Diff is defined as the rank difference between
the source node and the node itself as expressed in Eq.
(2). For the example illustrated in Fig. 4, when node N5
receives a new DIO message from malicious node M2, it
would compute the Rank_Diff. The Rank_Diff is 4 be-
cause the rank value of SourceRank is 1, and rank of
node N5 is 5. Therefore, Rank_Diff of node N5 in Fig. 4
is |0 − 4| = 4.
Rank Diff ¼ SourceRankð Þ− SelfRankð Þj j ð2Þ
The proposed system considers a DIO message as ma-
licious when Rank_Diff > Rank_Threshold. In Fig. 4, the
DIO message sent by node M2 will be identified as mali-
cious by node N5 as Rank_Diff > Rank_Threshold. By ap-
plying the proposed system in every node, nodes will
ignore any unreasonable DIO messages. Thus, wormhole
attack will be prevented. The proposed system is easy to
implement and does not need any additional hardware
or complex computing.
4 Simulation and results
In this section, we present the simulation environment
and results for the proposed approach. The goal of this
simulation is to evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed method. For wormhole detection, our system tries
to detect malicious DIO messages correctly. Confusion
matrix is used as measurements and in shown in Table 1.
In this section, six different experiments are conducted
to evaluate the performance of proposed system in dif-
ferent parameters.
This study uses the following performance measure-
ments to evaluate the proposed approach: precision






A ¼ TNþ TP
TPþ FNþ FPþ TN ð5Þ
4.1 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 is used to validate the correctness of pro-
posed approach, and it also describes how all experi-
ments in this research are conducted. In this section, all
nodes are deployed by random, the first deployed node
is root node. Malicious nodes are deployed after deploy-
ing all benign nodes. Table 2 illustrates the parameters
of this example, and Table 3 shows the location (coordi-
nates) of each node.
After all nodes are deployed, the routing path will be
established based on RPL protocol. Figure 7 illustrates
the topology before wormhole attack of experiment 1.
Figure 7 shows number of nodes, routing path, and
rank value of each node. For example, 9(15) means the
ninth node in this experiment and its rank value is 15.
After routing path of each node is established, the mali-
cious node 52 and 51 start to spread fake routing mes-









Fig. 5 Framework of proposed system
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Node 51 and node 52 first build their wormhole tun-
nel, and then node 52 replays the router advertisement
message from node 52’s parent node (node 29) to its
neighbor nodes. Neighbor nodes of node 52 will change
their routing path. In this experiment, nodes 3, 7, 9, 11,
14, 15, 18, 31, and 43 change their routing path. The
proposed approach could 100% identify the affected and
malicious nodes. For example, before wormhole attack,
the rank value of node 31 and its parent node (node 14)
is 10 and 9, respectively. Therefore, the Rank_Threshold
of node 31 is |9 − 10| = 1. After malicious nodes launch
wormhole attack, node 31 receives the advertisement
message from node 52. The rank value of advertise-
ment message is 6. Therefore, the Rank_Diff of node 31
is |6 − 10| = 4. According to the proposed detection
mechanism, if Rank_Diff > Rank_Threshold, the node
which sends abnormal advertisement message is malicious.
Table 4 illustrates the result of experiment 1. True positive
(TP) is 9 because all affected nodes could be detected (This
also means the proposed system could detect malicious
nodes.). True negative (TN) is 41 because there is not any
unaffected node to be identified as affected node (This also
means there is not any benign node to be identified as mali-
cious node.). Experiment 1 shows that the proposed system
could detect malicious nodes and affected nodes without
any false negative.
Experiment 1 already shows that the proposed sys-
tem could detect malicious wormhole tunnel. However,
Fig. 6 Process of wormhole detection model
Table 1 Confusion matrix
Identified as affected Identified as unaffected
Affected nodes True positive (TP) False positive (FP)
Unaffected nodes False negative (FN) True negative (TN)
Table 2 Parameters of experiment 1
Map size 500×500
Number of benign node 50
Communication ranges of benign nodes 100
Weight of rain fade 1.0
Length of wormhole tunnel 300
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applications of wireless sensor networks could be applied
to many areas. In this paper, experiments 2 to 5 are
conducted to evaluate if the proposed system could de-
tect wormhole attack in different environments and
applications.
4.2 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 will evaluate if the proposed system could
detect wormhole attack in different map sizes. Table 5 il-
lustrates the parameters in experiment 2, and Table 6
shows the result of experiment 2.
The result of experiment 2 shows that the proposed
system could detect wormhole attack perfectly in differ-
ent map sizes without any false negative. This is a very
important feature because nodes of wireless sensor net-
work could be deployed in a small area like a house or
be deployed in a large area like a farm. The proposed
system is suitable for various wireless sensor network
applications.
4.3 Experiment 3
Experiment 3 evaluates if the number of benign nodes
affects the detection performance or not. Table 7 pre-
sents the parameters of experiment 3, and Table 8 shows
the results.
The results of experiment 3 show that the number of
benign nodes does not affect the detection performance.
The number of nodes in a sensor network may vary in
different applications and applied environments. Some
applications such as smart homes need few nodes, and
some networks such as VANETs (Vehicular Ad Hoc
Networks) involve a lot of nodes. Detection mechanisms
[14] relying on neighbor node information may not be
able to detect wormholes if there are not enough nodes
in the environment. The results show that the proposed
system could detect wormholes in various network en-
vironments ranging from a small to large amount of
nodes.
4.4 Experiment 4
Experiment 4 tests if communication range of nodes will
affect the detection performance of proposed system.
Table 3 The location of each node in experiment 1
MAC address Coordinates
Root node 1 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:1 (10,100)
Node 2 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:2 (350,320)
Node 3 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:3 (439,99)
Node 4 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:4 (33,139)
Node 5 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:5 (418,384)
Node 6 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:6 (467,302)
Node 7 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:7 (382,41)
Node 8 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:8 (280,323)
Node 9 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:9 (427,71)
Node 10 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:10 (17,117)
Node 11 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:11 (354,123)
Node 12 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:12 (478,281)
Node 13 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:13 (208,174)
Node 14 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:14 (280,115)
Node 15 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:15 (278,72)
Node 16 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:16 (169,274)
Node 17 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:17 (144,376)
Node 18 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:18 (402,138)
Node 19 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:19 (75,457)
Node 20 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:20 (315,420)
Node 21 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:21 (79,158)
Node 22 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:22 (14,13)
Node 23 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:23 (183,170)
Node 24 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:24 (456,268)
Node 25 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:25 (26,384)
Node 26 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:26 (24,199)
Node 27 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:27 (162,72)
Node 28 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:28 (94,40)
Node 29 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:29 (22,225)
Node 30 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:30 (440,178)
Node 31 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:31 (296,161)
Node 32 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:32 (222,214)
Node 33 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:33 (114,326)
Node 34 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:34 (247,275)
Node 35 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:35 (230,260)
Node 36 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:36 (65,181)
Node 37 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:37 (61,284)
Node 38 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:38 (448,267)
Node 39 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:39 (296,323)
Node 40 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:40 (237,401)
Node 41 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:41 (475,99)
Node 42 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:42 (23,207)
Node 43 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:43 (309,112)
Node 44 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:44 (106,50)
Table 3 The location of each node in experiment 1 (Continued)
Node 45 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:45 (255,405)
Node 46 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:46 (195,61)
Node 47 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:47 (249,81)
Node 48 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:48 (324,323)
Node 49 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:49 (271,393)
Node 50 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:50 (489,356)
Malicious node 51 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:51 (69,216)
Malicious node 52 Mac addr:11:11:11:11:11:52 (345,99)
Lai EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:274 Page 7 of 11
Fig. 7 Topology of experiment 1 before wormhole attack
Fig. 8 Topology of experiment 1 after wormhole attack
Lai EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:274 Page 8 of 11
Nodes with longer communication range mean more
neighbor nodes and complex routing tables. Different
wireless sensor network applications need different com-
munication ranges. In Zigbee’s specification, communi-
cation range of Zigbee devices are from 50 to 300 m.
Table 9 illustrates the parameters in experiment 4, and
Table 10 shows the result of experiment 4.
The result of experiment 4 shows that communication
range of benign nodes would not affect the detection
performance of proposed system. Communication range
of nodes varies with applications. Some applications like
smart home need only shorter communication range,
and some network like VANETs (Vehicular Ad Hoc
Networks) need longer communication range (like 100 m
or longer). The result shows that the proposed system
could detect wormhole in different wireless sensor net-
work applications.
4.5 Experiment 5
In experiment 5, we evaluate the relation between the
distance of wormhole tunnel and the performance of
our approach. Distance of wormhole tunnel always longer
than communication range of benign nodes. If distance of
wormhole tunnel is shorter than communication range of
benign nodes, malicious nodes will never attract any
traffic. However, some detection mechanisms use trans-
mission time to estimate transmission distance nodes
[4]. If the length of wormhole is short, such detection
mechanism may not work. Table 11 illustrates the parame-
ters in experiment 5, and Table 12 shows the result of
experiment 5.
The result indicates that the proposed system will detect
wormhole attacks with different distances of wormhole
tunnel.
The results of experiments 1 to 5 show that proposed
system could detect wormhole attack well in different
situations. The proposed system is a location-based detec-
tion system. Although each node could not know their
exact location, the relative location will be get based on
rank value in RPL routing protocol. Any malicious DIO
messages will be ignored due to unreasonable rank value.
The proposed approach does not need any additional de-
vices like GPS or complex algorithm to compute location
of nodes. Some approaches like temporal leashes which
used transmission time to estimate transmission distance
nodes [4]; Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) which monitor
network traffic of neighbor nodes to detect wormhole
[14]. In this paper, we implement temporal leashes and
WEP as benchmark of proposed system. Experiment 6
evaluates the detection performance based on different rain
fade. Table 13 illustrates the parameters in experiment 6,
and Table 14 shows the result of experiment 6.
Result of experiment 5 shows that the proposed sys-
tem and WEP could detect wormhole perfect in different
rain fade levels. Detection accuracy of packet leashes will
vary by rain fade because some benign nodes are identi-
fied as malicious due to Network latency. Packet leashes
approach used transmission time to estimate transmis-
sion distance. But packet leashes did not consider that
network latency could result in longer transmission time.
Once Network transmission is unstable, benign nodes
would be identified as malicious nodes.
Number of benign nodes is also a very important par-
ameter to evaluate a detection mechanism of wormhole.
Some detection approaches need neighbor nodes’ infor-
mation to detect wormhole attack. Table 15 illustrates
the parameters in experiment 7, and Table 16 shows the
result of experiment 7.








Table 5 Parameters of experiment 2
Map size 200 m×200 m, 300 m×300 m,
500 m×500 m, 800 m×800 m,
1000 m×1000 m
Number of benign node 100
Communication ranges of benign nodes 100 m
Weight of rain fade 1.0
Length of wormhole tunnel 300 m
Table 6 Result of experiment 2
Map size
200×200 300×300 500×500 800×800 1000×1000
Accuracy (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Precision (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Recall (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Table 7 Parameters of experiment 3
Map size 500 m×500 m
Number of benign nodes 10, 30, 50, 100, 200
Communication range of benign nodes 100 m
Weight of rain fade 1.0
Length of wormhole tunnel 300 m
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Table 8 Result of experiment 3
Number of benign nodes
10 30 50 100 200
Accuracy (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Precision (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Recall (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Table 9 Parameters of experiment 4
Map size 500 m×500 m
Number of benign node 100
Communication ranges of benign nodes (m) 50, 75, 100, 150, 200
Weight of rain fade 1.0
Length of wormhole tunnel 300 m
Table 10 Result of experiment 4
Communication range of benign nodes
10 30 50 100 200
Accuracy (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Precision (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Recall (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Table 11 Parameters of experiment 5
Map size 500 m×500 m
Number of benign node 100
Communication range of benign nodes 100 m
Weight of rain fade 1.0
Distance of wormhole tunnel (m) 150, 200, 300, 400, 500
Table 12 Result of experiment 5
Distance of wormhole tunnel
150 m 200 m 300 m 400 m 500 m
Accuracy (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Precision (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Recall (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Table 13 Parameters of experiment 6
Map size 500 m×500 m
Number of benign node 100
Communication range of benign nodes 100 m
Weight of rain fade 1.0, 1.2, 1.5, 1.8, 2.0
Distance of wormhole tunnel 300 m
Table 14 Result of experiment 6
Rain fade
1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.0
Accuracy of proposed system (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Accuracy of packet leashes (%) [4] 99 79 64 54 49
Accuracy of WAP (%) [14] 100 100 100 100 100
Table 15 Parameters of experiment 7
Map size 500 m×500 m
Weight of rain fade 1.0
Communication range of benign nodes 100 m
Number of benign nodes 10, 30, 50, 100, 200
Distance of wormhole tunnel 300 m
Table 16 Result of experiment 7
Number of benign nodes
10 30 50 100 200
Accuracy of proposed system (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Accuracy of packet leashes (%) [4] 100 99 99 99 99
Accuracy of WAP (%) [14] 71 95 100 100 100
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The result of experiment 7 indicates that WAP will
have low accuracy when few nodes are deployed.
WAP analyzed neighbor nodes’ traffic, if there are
enough neighbor nodes, WAP could not get enough
information to detect wormhole well. According to
experiments 6 and 7, the results show the proposed
system outperform WAP and packet leashes. Our
system could apply to most wireless sensor network
applications without additional hardware. The results
of experiments 1 to 7 show that the proposed system
could 100% detect wormhole. Compared with traditional
wormhole detection approach, the proposed system
has higher accuracy rate. Moreover, the proposed sys-
tem does not need any additional hardware or special
nodes. The experiments show the proposed system is
a good security mobility management mechanism for
wireless sensor network.
5 Conclusions
Wireless sensor network or IoT will be the trend, and
more and more wireless sensor network applications
have been developed in the world. Due to the nature of
wireless sensor network, the devices have only limited
computing and electricity capability. Thus, wormhole
detection in wireless sensor networks becomes a chal-
lenge. This study proposes a wormhole detection mech-
anism based on RPL routing protocol without additional
hardware requirement. The simulation results show the
proposed system could detect wormhole correctly. The
proposed detection system focuses on the availability of
IPv6 wireless sensor network. However, confidentiality is
also important for the application of wireless sensor net-
work. Malicious nodes can make fake DIO messages to
evade detection. Wireless sensor network applications
might apply IPSec technology like IPsec-for-6LoWPAN
to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of wireless
sensor network applications. The proposed detection
system could be a good security mobility management
mechanism for wireless sensor network because (1) the
proposed system has 100% accuracy; (2) the proposed
system does not need any special hardware or special
nodes; (3) the proposed system could be applied in any
environment; the proposed system needs only few com-
puting resources.
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